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Introduction: President Barack Obama famously reassured Americans that the new
health care law would not result in loss of health insurance coverage. He declared, “If
you like your health plan, you can keep it.” Despite the fact that the health care law is
now more popular than ever, if Americans like the law, can we keep it? 1 On March 23rd,
2010, President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
commonly known as PPACA, Obamacare, or the ACA*, which would change the
landscape of the individual health insurance market.2 Previously, insurers in the
individual market could underwrite participants to achieve a more desirable risk pool.
The ACA forced insurers in the individual market to offer every individual the same
premiums in a transparent marketplace. This change, along with others, has caused the
individual market struggle with stability. Those in the industry have questioned the
feasibility of the ACA, as demonstrated by the high profile pullouts of several large
insurers. If these trends continue, the law may not survive.
This thesis will explore the stability issues in the market and provide analysis about
possible solutions. First, a broad outline of the individual health insurance and the ACA
will be discussed. Then, the specific issues causing instability in the market will be
explored, along with an analysis of the premium increases in the individual market.
Finally, possible solutions along with their feasibility will be analyzed. Special attention
will be given to the rise in premiums in the 2017 plan year and the future of the law under
a Trump Administration. Ultimately, this thesis hopes to outline possible policy
objectives for the federal government to achieve its goal of providing affordable health
insurance to all while providing insurers with a functional and actuarially stable insurance
market.
* In this thesis, the law will be referred to as the ACA
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Background: During the 2008 Presidential Campaign, voters were concerned about the
exponential rise in health care costs. At the time, the average family spent $11,841 on
medical care, which was $1,000 more than the yearly salary of a minimum wage worker.2
Annual premiums in the individual market could exceed $10,000.2 At the time of the
election in 2008, 14.6% of Americans were uninsured according to a Gallup
Poll.3 Democratic Nominee and eventual president-elect, Barack Obama, promised to
sign a universal health care law by the end of his first term that “not only guarantees
coverage for every American, but also brings down the cost of health care and reduces
every family's premiums by as much as $2,500.”2
Before the passage of the ACA, Americans had no promise of health insurance. Most
Americans received subsidized health insurance plans through their employers. This
system was the result of wage freezes during World War II. The National War Labor
Board ruled that health benefits were not considered wages and therefore not subject to
wage freezes.2 From then on, employers used health benefits to attract workers.
Furthermore, in the 1950s, the IRS ruled that health insurance should not be subject to a
wage tax since it is not considered part of an employee’s wage.2 The IRS created a large
tax loophole favorable to both workers and employers. Inadvertently, by favoring these
groups, the IRS made reforming the health care financing system nearly politically
impossible. Ultimately, the United States found itself in a policy trap where it had created
an “increasingly costly and complicated system that [had] satisfied enough of the public
and so enriched the Health-care industry as to make change extraordinarily difficult"5
For those who fall outside the employer-sponsored system and are ineligible for
government-sponsored care through Medicaid and Medicare, acquiring health insurance
prior to the ACA was extremely challenging. People who purchased coverage in the
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individual market tended to be early retirees, self-employed, or worked in jobs without
health benefits.6 Prior to the ACA, the individual market covered about 16 million or 6%
of Americans.7 Insurers were able to underwrite based on health status in order to charge
an actuarially fair premium. In general, the risk pool in the individual market tended to be
worse than the one in the group market because those in the individual market purposely
sought out insurance. A study from America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) in 2002
found that 8.7% of those in the individual market had to pay an additional premium
because they were considered substandard risk.6 In addition to charging unhealthier
individuals higher premiums, insurers reserved the right to deny insurance to anyone
deemed “too risky.” High-risk individuals could find themselves being rejected by
multiple insurers but accepted by another. The same AHIP study found that 11.8% of
applicants were outright rejected.6
In some states, if an individual was denied insurance from all insurers, he or she could try
to obtain coverage through a high-risk pool. These pools offered subsidized coverage, but
enrollees still were considered substandard risks and had to pay higher than average
premiums. Also, some states like Florida, had frozen enrollment while other states, like
California, had a waiting list before people could enroll.8 If someone was able to enroll in
a high-risk pool, he or she still may not receive the health care they needed due to policy
exclusions. These provisions exclude coverage for specific medical conditions during an
elimination period or even the entire length of the policy. 6 For example, if someone were
relegated to the high-risk pool due to back pain, his or her policy would likely explicitly
not cover treatment for back pain. Dissatisfaction over these policies factored into
President Obama’s decision to turn health care reform into a national priority.
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Following President Obama’s inauguration in January 2009, Congress began drafting a
health care reform bill. The bill was modeled after Massachusetts’ successful health care
reform from 2006. Creating a single payer system like ones found in comparable
developed countries like the UK, France, or Canada was too politically unfeasible.
Massachusetts’ model was a private market reform based on three principles: Guaranteed
issue, mandated coverage, and premium subsidies for those who qualified.2 In the state of
Massachusetts, a health insurer could not reject any applicant. Furthermore, the
introduction of modified community rating prevented insurers from charging applicants
more based on health status.2 To avoid adverse selection, every single person in the state
of Massachusetts is legally required to purchase health insurance or pay a tax penalty. To
ease the financial burden of mandatory health insurance, the state provides subsidies for
the purchase of health plans. Citizens in the individual market can buy insurance through
an online platform, called the Connector, where shoppers are given to the tools to
compare health plans to make informed decisions.2 Most importantly, the law seemed to
be working. When Congress was considering health care reform at the federal level in
2009, Massachusetts had the lowest uninsured rate in the country at 5.1%.9 In addition,
more people were seeking out preventative care, the amount of unnecessary ER and
inpatient visits fell, and fewer adults reported avoiding care due to high costs. 9
Riding the wave of progressive excitement with the election of Barack Obama, the
Democrats had taken the presidency, achieved a majority in the House of
Representatives, and reached a supermajority in the Senate. Despite having majorities in
both chambers of Congress, the Democrats did not find it easy to create a consensus bill.
President Obama wanted bipartisan support for the bill, but the Republicans were
encouraged by their leadership to decline any deal.10 Therefore, the bill had to be
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agreeable to Democrats across the ideological spectrum because the Senate needed the
vote of every single Democrat to achieve cloture at 60 votes. When drafting the bill,
Congress gave various interest groups, such as AHIP (America’s Health Insurance Plans,
the health insurance lobby), the pharmaceutical lobby, and the hospital lobby a seat the
table. These groups wielded substantial influence over the bill.10 Karen Ignagni, the
president of AHIP, realized health reform would put the insurance industry under attack,
so she publicly promised that AHIP would support the effort.10 However, Ignagni refused
to support a bill without an individual mandate.10 Insurers worried that a bill with
guaranteed issue but lacking a mandate would cause adverse selection and wreak havoc
on the stability of the individual market. In addition, AHIP opposed a publicly run health
insurance plan that would directly compete with private insurers, also known as the
public option.10
Progressives in Congress supported the public option because they believed it would
reduce costs through lowering administrative expenses and achieving economies of
scale.11A publicly run insurer would pay reimbursement rates lower than private insurers
and probably pay rates similar to Medicare.11 The public option died in the Senate due to
the opposition of Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT).10,11 He threatened to filibuster any bill
that contained a public option.11 Lieberman likely opposed the public option because his
home state of Connecticut is a major hub for health insurers. However, the Democrats
could not achieve 60 votes to achieve cloture without Lieberman. The Democrats had to
acquiesce to Lieberman’s demand and relinquish the hope of the public option to keep
health care reform alive.
Congress continued to bicker over other details of the bill, including the generosity of the
subsidies and the severity of the individual mandate.2 The subsidies were tied to a

Carnale 7
maximum percent of income that could be spent on health insurance premiums.13 The
final subsidy guideline covered those at or below 400% of the FPL (Federal Poverty
Line) as set forth in the more generous House bill.14 A more generous subsidy would be
beneficial to the insurance market because insurance becomes more affordable for more
people, creating a larger risk pool with greater diversity. The compromise bill required
the purchase of insurance or the payment of a fine of $695 or 2.5% whichever is
greater.14 The penalty is set to be phased in by 2016. The final mandate was a blend of
the House bill, which had a fine of 2.5% of income, and the Senate bill, which had a fine
up to $750 or 2% of income. 14 The Senate bill originally had a tax penalty of $950, but it
was lowered to $750 by the Snowe-Schumer amendment.15 Liberals in Congress and
insurance companies opposed the amendment because they believed a reduced penalty
would not be meaningful enough to compel people to buy insurance. 15 A study
commissioned by insurers and conducted by PriceWaterhouse Coopers concluded that
premiums would rise thousands more than projected due to weaker penalties. 15 The
increase would be due to effects of adverse selection, as healthy people would forgo the
cost of insurance and simply pay the penalty. Then the market would be weighted
towards unhealthy people who have higher expected costs and utilization, leading to
higher premiums.
Finally, in March 2010, President Barack Obama signed the bill into a law after much
deal making, debate, and uncertainty. In the signing ceremony, President Obama
prophetically stated “This legislation will not fix everything that ails our health care
system, but it moves us in decisively in the right direction.”10 The signing of the ACA
marked the beginning of a contentious era in American politics that still exists to this day.
Partially as a result of the ACA, the Democrats lost their majorities in the House and
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Senate during President Obama’s term.2 With the election of Donald Trump in 2016, the
legacy of the law is in grave danger.
Plans on the Individual Market: One of the key goals of the ACA was to create a
transparent and consumer-friendly individual marketplace. President Obama hoped to
make the experience of shopping for health insurance comparable to shopping on
Amazon.2 Each state would be responsible for creating an exchange or marketplace
where consumers could compare health plans and make informed purchases.2 These
exchanges had to be operating by the end of 2013, so citizens could purchase coverage
for the 2014 plan year. However, several states, all of which had Republican governors,
declined to establish state-run exchanges and used the federally run healthcare.gov
platform instead.16 Every plan offered on the exchange must cover a set of essential
benefits, such as outpatient care, emergency services, hospitalization, pregnancy,
maternity and newborn care, prescription drugs, lab services, and birth control.17 Some
preventive care services are free, and some plans cover additional services without any
out of pocket costs.17
Plans are categorized into metal tiers based on their actuarial value, the average amount
of benefit costs a plan covers. The lowest tier is the bronze level (60% actuarial value),
followed by silver (70% actuarial value), gold (80% actuarial value), and platinum (90%
actuarial value).18 Those under the age of 30 are eligible to purchase catastrophic plans.
These types of plans only provide insurance coverage after reaching the high
deductible.18
Subsidies and Individual Mandate: Insurers salivated at the prospect of the insurance
subsidies and the individual mandate working together to increase membership in the
individual market. The subsidies cap the amount of premium paid to a percent of income.
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For example, an individual earning $30,000 is at about 250% above the FPL. The
maximum amount this individual is required to contribute towards the benchmark plan is
6.3% of their income, or about $1,890. The difference between the annual premium of the
benchmark plan and $1,890 will be given to the individual as a subsidy. The subsidies are
structured to insulate consumers from premium increases. The subsidies create a
permanent market for health insurance because subsidized enrollees will pay the same
amount each year regardless of premium increases. The subsidies support people to up to
400% of the federal poverty line, and the amount of subsidy decreases as income
increases. 18 The subsidy schedule is as follows18:
Income Level

Maximum Premium Contribution as a
Percent of Income

Up to 133% FPL

2% of Income

133-150% FPL

3-4% of Income

150-200% FPL

4-6.3% of Income

200-250% FPL

6.3-8.05% of Income

250-300% FPL

8.05-9.5% of Income

300-400% FPL

9.5% of Income

The subsidy is a refundable tax credit. 19 Individuals can choose to either have their
subsidy be paid directly to their health insurer to cover their monthly premiums or choose
to take a tax deduction worth the entire subsidy when they file their annual tax returns.19
The subsidy is tied to the second lowest cost silver plan in the relevant area.18 The
amount of the subsidy does not vary with the plan an individual chooses. If an individual
chooses a more generous plan with a more expensive premium than the second lowest
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cost silver plan, he or she will pay a higher percentage of their income than the subsidy
anticipated. However, individuals generally choose to enroll in silver plans. For the 2016
plan year, 70% of enrollment nationwide was in silver plans. 20
In order to maintain a diverse risk pool, the ACA has an individual mandate (aka shared
responsibility payment). As of 2016, individuals who do not purchase a qualifying health
insurance plan must pay a tax penalty of $695 or 2.5% of taxable income, whichever is
greater.18 In the future, the $695 penalty will increase with inflation. 18 There are
exemptions for financial hardship and for certain groups of people, including religious
objectors. 18 The tax penalty is reported on the federal income tax form. 20 However, if an
individula is not required to file a federal income tax form, he/she is not required to pay
the shared responsibility payment.20 Furthermore, as a result of an executive order signed
on January 20th, the IRS will no longer automatically reject income tax forms that do not
provide information about health coverage.21 It is unclear if those who do not report their
health coverage status will be required to pay the tax in the future.
The individual mandate is absolutely vital to the success of the ACA because it creates a
diverse, balanced risk pool. If everyone is forced to buy health insurance, regardless of
health status, the low costs of the healthy people will cross subsidize the high claim costs
of the unhealthy population. As a result, premiums are lower and the market is more
stable for insurers.20 Without the individual mandate, fewer healthy people will buy
coverage in the individual market. Therefore, insurers will have to raise premiums to
cover expected claim costs. As a result of the higher premiums, the relatively healthier
people in the risk pool begin to drop out, and insurers will have to again raise premiums.
This cycle would continue until insurers lose too much money on the individual market
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and exit the market. This severe adverse selection is more commonly known as the
“death spiral.”
The legality of the individual mandate and subsidies was called into question in the 2015
Supreme Court case, King v. Burwell. 22 The plaintiffs in the case argued that the wording
of the law forbids the government from offering subsidies for plans bought on the
federally run exchange.22 The Obama Administration feared the foundation of the ACA
would collapse if the Court ruled against them. Because the majority of states rely on the
federal exchange, if the Supreme Court ruled in favor of King, millions of people would
be unable to afford insurance. Ultimately, the Obama Administration won the case
because the court found the act of refusing to offer tax subsidies on the federal exchange
“would destabilize the individual insurance market in any State with a Federal Exchange,
and likely create the very 'death spirals' that Congress designed the Act to avoid.”22
Furthermore, the court ruled that individual mandate was legal because it was technically
a tax, which the federal government has the constitutional authority to levy and collect. 22
This interpretation of the law was fairly interesting because at no point during the ACA
negotiations or in the text of the law, is the word ‘tax’ used to refer to the individual
responsibility payment. Although the Obama Administration did win the case, it was a
somewhat controversial 6-3 decision, with the four liberal justices, Justice Anthony
Kennedy, and surprisingly, conservative Chief Justice John Roberts, voting in favor of
the defendants.22
Financing of the Individual Market and the ACA: The various aspects of the ACA are
mainly funded through taxes on high-income individuals, insurers, and pharmaceutical
companies.18 President Obama, keeping true to his campaign promise to not raise taxes on
the middle class, only increased the Medicare Part A tax by 0.9% on individuals earning
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over 200K and on couples earning more than 250K.2,18 Furthermore, individuals who do
not obtain a qualifying health plan are required to pay a tax penalty. The ACA would also
tax high-cost plans.18 The so-called Cadillac Tax would tax overly generous plans that
cover beyond the threshold set by the government. These plans would be subject to a
40% tax of the excess amount. 18 However, this tax proved to be controversial because
opponents feared employers would switch to plans with lower premiums and a higher
cost-sharing burden on workers to avoid the tax.23 Because the Cadillac Tax is indexed to
general inflation and not the faster growing medical inflation, it is likely that over time
more run of the mill plans, not just overly generous plans, will be subject to this tax. 18
The Cadillac tax implementation has been pushed off until 2020, but Congress will likely
continue to push it off indefinitely.23
The exchange is funded through user fees levied on insurers on the exchange.18 Insurers
that offer individual plans off the government marketplace (‘Off-exchange’ plans) do not
have to pay this fee. The federal government is also imposing an annual fee on the health
insurance sector.18 In 2017, this fee will be $13.9 billion.18 After 2018, the fee will be
increased each year according to premium growth, giving insurers yet another reason to
try to control premium growth. 18
CBO Projections: By design, the ACA is intended to have no effect on the national
debt.2 The CBO expected the initial implementation of the subsidies and marketplace
expansion would increase the deficit but would eventually be offset as the market
adjusted and more people became insured, as shown in Figure 123.
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Figure 1
By 2017, the CBO expected the ACA to actually lower the deficit. These projections
include the Cadillac tax, which is currently delayed until 2020.24 The ACA is projected to
have a net savings of $124 billion between 2010 and 2019. The taxes discussed above
and reductions in direct spending, such as lower Medicare reimbursements are expected
to balance out the costs of the ACA.24
In 2016, the CBO estimated all federal subsidies for those under 65 would have a net cost
of $660 billion and would continue to increase by 5.4% per year.23 The federal
government subsidizes health care not just through marketplace subsidies, but also
through Medicaid coverage, tax breaks for employer-sponsored coverage, and Medicare
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benefits in specific cases. Federal marketplace subsidies only account for 10% of the total
net subsidy, while Medicaid coverage and tax breaks for employer-sponsored coverage
(mainly the premium tax exclusion) account for 43% and 41% of the net subsidy
respectively. By 2026, the CBO projects the total subsidy payments to reach $1.1 trillion
(4.1% of GDP). 23 The amount of media attention and political criticisms the ACA
subsidies receive is much greater than their proportional cost to the government.
In 2016, the CBO reduced its ten-year cost estimate of the ACA from $1.344 trillion to
$1.207 trillion mainly due to lower than expected enrollment on the exchanges.23 The
federal government incorrectly predicted that more employers would stop offering
coverage and force their employees onto the exchange, increasing the cost of subsidized
coverage for the government. 23 However, this reduction will be somewhat offset by
revised downward projections for wages of low-income earners. As a result, more people
will qualify for larger subsidies. 23
The CBO projects premiums for silver plans will increase 8.5% a year and insurer
spending per enrollee will grow at a rate of 2.2% per year.25 Premiums for plans on the
exchange are expected to rise faster than the underlying medical trend.25 To try to control
costs, insurers are offering plans with lower reimbursement rates, narrower networks, and
tighter management.25 Since subsidies are tied to maximum percent of income and not to
a percent of premium, individuals are insulated from premium increases. As a result, the
government must carefully monitor health insurance costs and ensure the individual
market is functioning properly to keep premium costs relatively low. If premiums
continue to increase by 8.5% a year, the current state of the subsidy program could
become unsustainable. The government would have to offer less generous subsidies,
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which would be harmful to the insurance market, as more people will lack the funds for
insurance.
Insurer Regulation in Individual Market: The ACA placed serious restrictions on
insurer behavior in the individual market in exchange for providing insurers with greater
enrollment and premium stabilization. Famously, the ACA eliminated lifetime limits and
introduced guaranteed issue, meaning that no one can be rejected for a preexisting
condition.18 Plans on the exchanges cannot price based on health status or sex. Rating
variation can only be based on geography, family size, metal tier, tobacco usage (limited
to 1.5:1 ratio), and age (limited to 3:1 ratio).18 Because plans are community rated
(meaning everyone pays the same premium regardless of health status), the health of the
insurance market depends on a diverse risk pool. Healthy people in the insurance pool
inherently subsidize the sicker individuals by paying more than the actuarially fair
premium. Previously, plans were experience-rated, meaning unhealthy people who
needed insurance the most were charged much higher premium rates. The ACA was
designed to eliminate this practice to create a fairer market.
All plans available in the marketplace must have at least an 80% medical loss ratio
(MLR), while all group plans must have a minimum MLR of 85%.18 The MLR represents
the percent of premium spent on clinical services, quality, and other medical costs. 18 This
does not include administrative and underwriting cost. 18 If a plan’s MLR is below the
benchmark, the insurer must rebate the excess premium back to the enrollees. 18 This
regulation forces insurers to spend more on their enrollees and effectively caps their
profits.
Premium Stabilization: Because of the guaranteed issue regulation and the marketplace
subsidies, many new customers flooded into the insurance markets. However, insurers
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cautiously approached the reformed individual market because they had no data on these
new customers. In the most basic sense, insurance premiums are the expected cost of
medical claims plus some expense loading. If insurers have no prior experience with their
enrollees or no sense of their behavior, it becomes nearly impossible to model expected
costs and develop a viable premium. In light of insurers’ worries, the government
established a premium stabilization program consisting of three parts: risk adjustment,
risk corridor, and reinsurance.
Risk adjustment is the only permanent program of the three. The goal of risk adjustment
is to “create a stable market in which health plan premiums will reflect the value of the
coverage offered.”28 Risk adjustment transfers funds from insurers with relatively
healthier enrollees to insurers with relatively sicker enrollees. If an insurer were to
purposely design a plan that would attract healthier enrollees, the insurer would not keep
all the profit because the insurer still needs to subsidize other firms with the sicker
enrollees through a risk adjustment payment. Risk adjustment is a zero-sum game,
meaning that the fees some insurers pay is equal to the total payments other insurers
receive.31 The payment is based on a complex formula that takes the difference between
the plan premium estimate with risk selection and without risk selection.28 The model that
Health and Human Services (HHS) uses to determine the payments is based on current
year data.28 Risk adjustment is vital in creating a competitive marketplace because it
prevents adverse selection in the health insurance market.
The risk adjustment formula gives each plan a plan liability risk score (PLRS), which
takes into account a plan’s generosity and enrollee health status.29 The PLRS gives each
enrollee a risk score composed of predicted insurance expenditures based on
demographic and plan data, which is then compared to the enrollee’s actual experience.28
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The PLRS is used to calculate the plan’s premium with risk selection. The premium with
risk selection is compared to the premium without risk selection through the formula
shown below. 29

Figure 2
If the difference is positive, then the plan receives a transfer payment to compensate for
its worse than market average risk.29 The left side of the equation represents the premium
with risk selection, which is the product of the PLRS, the induced demand factor and the
geographical cost factor. 29 The induced demand factor considers how a plan’s generosity
would change an enrollee’s behavior to receive services more or less than necessary. The
denominator represents the market average premium with risk selection. The right side
calculates the premium without risk selection. This part of the equation calculates what a
plan’s premium should be based solely on the actuarial value, allowable rating factors,
induced demand factor, and geographical cost factor. 29 The allowable rating factor is
based on the strict underwriting restrictions of the ACA. A plan’s premium without risk
selection is then divided by the market average. The difference between the premium
with risk selection and without risk selection is scaled to the average premium in the
market, giving the risk transfer payment.
Since the risk adjustment formula takes into account the market average in the
denominator, by definition, larger insurers are closer to market average. If a larger insurer
has a higher PLRS than average, the market PLRS will be skewed upward and it is likely
than the other plans will have to pay higher risk adjustment payments. In contrast, smaller
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insurers are at a disadvantage because their payments are more likely to be skewed in a
negative way. 30 The skewedness can become an issue for small insurers that owe risk
adjustment payments, especially since they tend to have less capital. Risk adjustment also
does not take into account the health of the national insurance market. If a particular
market has worse risks than the national average, markets with better risks do not
subsidize it. Theoretically, a plan with a high PLRS may still owe transfer funds if the
market average is even higher. Risk adjustment is not intended to “ensure any greater
stability from one year to the next in the market premiums.”30 Risk adjustment equalizes
the competition among plans in a single market but does not offset high claim costs or
alleviate pricing risk.
The other two programs, reinsurance and risk corridor, are temporary programs that are
effective from 2014-2016.31 Reinsurance reimburses insurers when enrollees have
extraordinary high claims. Insurers feared that enrollees on the exchange would be sicker
than the general population and therefore be more likely incur catastrophic costs.
Lawmakers planned for reinsurance to be temporary because they anticipated that highcost enrollees would participate in the marketplace first.31 As the insurance market began
to stabilize and more people enrolled with time, lawmakers predicted the population
participating in the individual market would match the general population.31 They hoped
that as the risk pool increased in size, the healthy people would subsidize the sicker
population, eliminating a need for a government reinsurance pool. The reinsurance fund
comes from a fee levied on all insurance plans, including those outside the individual
market.31 HHS then redistributes this fund to insurers in the individual market with high
claim costs. In 2014, HHS anticipated paying 80% of a claim in excess $45,000 (up to a
cap of $250,000), but HHS has the power to alter this threshold to ensure payments don’t
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exceed the fund. 32 However, HHS was ultimately able to pay a coinsurance rate of 100%
in 2014.32 In 2015, the attachment point remained at $45,000 but the coinsurance rate was
initially reduced to 50% before HHS decided to raise it to 55.1%.32 For 2016, HHS
anticipates a $90,000 attachment point with a coinsurance rate of 50%.32 Like, risk
adjustment, reinsurance was designed to be budget neutral.28 The federal government
contributes no monies to the fund; it is entirely financed by insurer payments.
RI RA
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of claims. Insurers in the lower half of claims paid subsidize the insurers with higher
claims paid and higher risk. When looking at payments as a percent of total premiums,
the lower half pays in 15% and the upper half receives 15%, which matches the budget
neutral principle. Instead of rewarding the insurers with low actuarial risk by allowing
them to profit from risk selection, insurers with high actuarial risk must be subsidized to
keep a competitive market and avoid adverse selection. These programs encourage
insurers to save money by properly managing and preventing conditions instead of
purposely trying to design plans that encourage risk selection.
Risk corridor, the final premium stabilization program, has not worked nearly as well as
the others. The government intended to use risk corridor to provide a cushion for insurers
when pricing plans for the individual market. If expected claims (as embedded in the
premium) were within 3% of actual claims, insurers would keep all the gains or losses.31
However, if actual claims exceeded expected claims by more than 3%, HHS would
reimburse insurers at least 50% of the excess loss. If the expected claims exceeded the
actual claims by more than 3%, insurers would pay HHS at least 50% of the excess. This
program was designed to finance underpriced plans while penalizing overpriced plans to
promote accurate pricing. This program was intended to be temporary because insurers
should in theory understand the exchange population better with time and therefore will
be able to price plans properly in the future.
Risk adjustment and risk corridor seem somewhat similar on the surface. However, risk
adjustment considers the risk selection of the plan whereas risk corridor is based solely
on the premium level. If a plan prices assuming they will have worse risks, but their
experience reflects better than average risk, the premium would be underpriced and the
plan would have healthier than average participants. Thus, the insurer would have to
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make risk corridor and risk adjustment payments. On the other hand, if an insurer designs
a bare bones plan to attract healthy enrollees and prices the plan under this expectation,
they will not have to pay into risk corridor, assuming healthy people actually enroll in the
plan. The expected claims would then match the actual claims. However, the insurer
would still need to make risk adjustment payments because the plan would contain
healthier than average participants. Risk adjustment intends to evaluate plans based on
their level of coverage, so this less generous plan would be penalized.
Initially, the federal government was allowed to provide funding for risk corridor
payments.32 However, Republican politicians perceived the payments as a bailout to
health insurers and rewrote the regulation to ensure it was budget neutral. 34 Due to this
change, the risk corridor fund fell extremely short, and HHS was only able to reimburse
insurers 12.6 cents on the dollar in 2014.32 Between 2014 and 2015, the federal
government owed insurers about $8.3 billion.34 Insurers were furious because they had
priced their plans expecting this payment. Some smaller insurers, like some co-ops based
in Iowa and New York, were forced to dissolve as result of missed risk corridor
payments.34 Other insurers have sued the federal government for payment, and as of the
end of 2016, these lawsuits are still ongoing.34
Issues in the Exchanges: By many metrics, the ACA is achieving its goals. In 2016, the
uninsured rate reached an all-time low of 11%. People are generally happy with their
coverage,and the structure of the subsidies ensures plans remain affordable for those who
qualify.35 However, as even President Obama will openly admit, the law is far from
perfect. The exchanges face many problems with affordability, competition, and
enforcement of regulation that threaten the stability of the individual market.
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Issue of Affordability: In 2017, premiums in the individual market skyrocketed,
increasing by an average of 25%.36 In comparison, premiums rose 2% in 2015 and 7% in
2016.36 (When reports say ‘average premium’ they mean the premium of the second
lowest cost silver plan, off of which the subsidies are based) The Obama Administration
tried to stress that these premium increases do not affect the average marketplace enrollee
because the value of an individual’s subsidy increases with the premium. Of the 11.1
million enrollees on the marketplace in 2016, about 80% qualified for a subsidy.37 These
enrollees pay the same amount for insurance year after the year because their subsidies
increase with premiums rather than their out of pocket expenses. Affordability especially
concerns the federal government and those in the individual market with incomes above
400% of the FPL. For each year that premiums increase, the federal government must
finance the increase in subsidies. If the growth in premiums becomes unsustainable for
the federal government to support with the current financing model, the government will
be forced to increase taxes, create new taxes, reduce the generosity of the subsidies or
divert funds from other programs. At the rate premiums are increasing, this scenario is
becoming much more likely in the near future. The federal government must find a way
to fix the affordability problem out of both necessity and responsibility to its citizens.
The other group that high premiums hurt is, ironically, higher income Americans who
purchase coverage on the exchange. These individuals do not receive premium subsidies,
so they are not insulated from premium increases like lower income Americans. In fact, a
study by the Commonwealth Fund found that higher income individuals were more likely
to view coverage as less affordable and to have higher deductible plans. Individuals
above 400% of the FPL may choose to go uninsured and pay the tax penalty. Of
uninsured Americans, nearly half are uninsured because they tried to get coverage, but it
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was too expensive.38 The high premiums likely cause some adverse selection in this
group because only the healthy individuals could feasibly choose to forgo insurance.
Premiums likely spiked in 2017 because insurers realized they were underpricing their
plans.39 Premiums for plan year 2017 were filed in spring 2016, so insurers had two years
of data: 2014 and 2015. Only then could insurers start judging behavior and trend more
accurately to price more exact premiums. Furthermore, the reinsurance program ended in
2017, so insurers were entirely on the hook for high cost claims. As a result, insurers
needed to increase premiums because these high claims would only be spread across the
insurer’s enrollees, not the entire insurance market.
Insurers may have originally underpriced their plans to gain more market share, but by
2017, premiums needed to rise for plans to be sustainable. Evidence for the underpricing
theory is backed by CBO projections, as shown in figure 3.39

Figure 4
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The original 2009 projections for the 2016 annual premiums was about $5,000, 20%
lower than the actual experience. Likely, the CBO made more conservative estimates and
assumed insurers would be more cautious when determining pricing. Since premiums
spiked 25% in 2017, they moved closer to the original CBO projection and corrected for
the underpricing in previous years. Therefore, the sharp increases in 2017 could very
likely be a one time market correction rather than persistent trend.
However, it will be difficult to test the one time correction theory due to the market
disruption caused by the Trump administration. Even in their short time in office, the
administration has already taken action to weaken the ACA. The 2018 rates will be filed
in spring of this year. As of March, it is unclear how stringently the Trump administration
will enforce the ACA. On his first day in office, President Trump signed an executive
order that allowed him to “waive, defer, grant exemptions from, or delay” any tax laws or
penalties associated with the ACA.40 Soon after the inauguration, Trump senior advisor,
Kellyanne Conway stated in an interview with George Stephanopoulos that the Trump
Administration would stop enforcing the individual mandate.40 At the tail end of the open
2017 open enrollment period, shortly after taking office, the new administration stopped
running ads and outreach efforts to increase enrollment, despite the fact that these
initiatives had already been paid for and created by the Obama Administration.41 Without
even considering the possible repeal and replace of the ACA, evidence has shown that
Trump Administration will likely not vigorously enforce the regulations surrounding the
ACA. As a result, insurers fear the adverse selection problem will worsen and will
increase premiums yet again to protect themselves from higher expected claims.
In addition to raising premiums, insurers have been shifting costs to enrollees by raising
out of pocket costs to shield themselves from a worse risk pool. Even if a plan has
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affordable premiums, it may have high out of pocket costs, rendering it effectively
useless for routine care. Theoretically, there is nothing actuarially unstable with offering
less generous plans in the highly regulated exchange marketplace. Plans must offer
essential health benefits and risk adjustment prevents less generous plans from having a
competitive advantage. However, insurance is supposed to provide financial security and
peace of mind for the buyer. If potential enrollees see no financial value in having
coverage due to high out of pocket costs, they may choose to simply pay the individual
mandate penalty. This would worsen the adverse selection problem because only
relatively healthy people would choose to do this. Studies by the Kaiser Family
Foundation have found that satisfaction with deductibles has declined since 2014, and by
2016, only 51% percent of ACA enrollees reported being ‘satisfied’ with their deductible.
42

Furthermore, those in high deductible plans ($1500 for an individual, $3000 as a

family) find out of pocket costs to be more difficult to afford, as shown in figure 5 42

Figure 5
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As marketplace plans feature increasingly high deductibles and out of pocket costs as a
way to cut costs, insurers need to realize that buyers realize that more costs are being
shifted on to them. Although health care is complex, enrollees know when they have to
pay a bill. If costs become too high, insurance will no longer provide financial security
and buyers will exit the market. Insurers must provide a valuable product that buyers
want in order to create a sustainable market.
Issue of Competition: Recently, the individual market saw the high profile exits of
Aetna, UnitedHealthcare, and most recently, Humana. In April 2016, UnitedHealthcare
was the first to announce a mass exodus of the ACA exchanges except in a ‘handful’ of
places.43 United’s exit seemed to be purely a business decision as the company had lost
$475 million in 2015 and was on track to lose $650 million in 2016 at the time of their
announcement to exit the market.43 Aetna announced its exit later that year in August. Its
exit surprised many observers, especially since earlier in the year, CEO Mark Bertolini
spoke highly of the exchanges and intended to expand the company’s presence.44 Unlike
UnitedHealthcare, Aetna’s decision to leave the marketplace was not purely a business
decision. Aetna had been losing money on the exchanges: it had lost $100 million in 2014
and $131 million in 2015 despite projecting a $100 million profit.44 The vast majority of
the marketplaces Aetna exited were unprofitable. On top of this, Aetna was due for a
$100 million payment from CMS for risk corridor and only received about $12.5 million
of it.44 However, for seventeen counties that Aetna exited in Florida, Georgia, and
Missouri, the Department of Justice (DOJ) found compelling evidence that Aetna had
pulled out of these markets to avoid anti-trust accusations.44 (At the time, the DOJ had
sued Aetna over anti-trust concerns from its proposed merger with health insurer
Humana. Humana had a large presence in these 17 counties. Aetna ultimately lost the
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case and called off the merger with Humana.) According to the court opinion from the
merger case, Aetna officials had allegedly told HHS Secretary Burwell that if the merger
were blocked, Aetna “would likely have to revisit its plans for and presence on the public
exchanges.”44 Three of the counties in Florida that Aetna pulled out of were profitable.
The Court believes Aetna will likely compete in those counties again.44
In February 2017, Humana announced that it would no longer participate in the
individual marketplace for the 2018 plan year.45 Humana cited “signs of an unbalanced
risk pool” after preliminary data to justify its decision to exit the market.45 Humana had
already been rolling back its presence on the marketplace and was only participating in
11 states with a total of 150,000 enrollees. 45 Ultimately, the effects of this decision will
not be felt until the next open enrollment period, but Humana is just another example of
an insurer struggling due to uncertainty surrounding the marketplace.
The health insurance marketplace is designed to work best when there are many insurers
that compete to provide a high quality but low-priced product. When insurers decide to
pull out of the market, it has a noticeable effect on premiums. Even though
UnitedHealthcare did not have the lowest or second-lowest premium in most of the
markets they were in, economist Jonathan Gruber (one of the original architects of the
ACA) estimated that the cost of the second lowest price silver plan would have decreased
by 5.4% if UnitedHealthcare had stayed in the marketplace.46 Furthermore, the same
study estimated that if all the insurers active in the individual market in 2011 were active
for the 2014 plan year, the second lowest silver plan would be 11.1% lower and the total
subsidy would decrease $1.7 billion.46 When an insurer drops out of the market, it affects
the market in two ways. First, that insurer could of actually priced the second lowest
premium if it had participated. Second, if the insurer had participated, the additional
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competition would have placed downward pressure on premiums. In the 2017 plan year,
there were 5 states that had exactly one insurer in the marketplace.35 Therefore, it is in
both the government’s and consumers’ best interest to attract more insurers to the market.
More insurers lead to a lower premium for individual consumers and to a lower subsidy
expense for the government.
UnitedHealthcare and Aetna, the largest and third largest health insurers in the nation
respectively, were not able to find footing in the individual market. 43,44 Their exits raise
following questions: Why can’t the largest, most successful insurers in the nation
generate profit in the ACA marketplaces? Is it the fault of the insurers or the law itself?
Part of the insurers’ issues do stem from the weakness of some regulations, which will be
explored later. However, there is compelling evidence that part of their struggles come
from an inability to adapt to the challenges in the marketplace. Much of Aetna and
UnitedHealthcare’s business comes from employer group plans. This experience does not
translate well to individual non-group plans. Before the ACA, the individual market was
small and in danger of disappearing, so it was not a focus of large insurers.2
UnitedHealthcare’s CEO cited struggles unique to the marketplace, such as “the smaller
overall market size and shorter term, [and] higher-risk profile” as to why
UnitedHealthcare was “unable to serve the exchanges effectively.” 43 In addition to the
challenges with the market structure, the population in the individual market tends to be
poorer, less educated, older, and more racially diverse than the general population. 16
Enrollees in the individual market are less ‘sticky’, meaning they are unlikely to stay with
the same plan every year because they gravitate towards the cheapest plans each year.
Since consumers are constantly switching plans, insurers have little incentive to stress
preventive care, which may lower medical costs in the long run. Furthermore, the
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population in the exchanges is similar to the Medicaid population and 81% of ACA
enrollees have incomes at or below 250% of the federal poverty line.35 More and more
plans are starting to mirror the narrow networks of Medicaid plans. 35 Despite the fact one
might expect large insurers, like Aetna or UnitedHealthcare, to be more successful in the
marketplace, it is actually smaller insurers specializing in Medicaid like Cetene that are
turning a profit.35 These insurers realized that the exchange population is similar to the
Medicaid population in the sense that they are low income and not ‘sticky.’ Also, they
were able to leverage their expertise in the Medicaid to create successful marketplace
plans. Larger insurers specialize in employer group insurance, which features a very
different population with different behaviors. These large insurers must realize that in the
marketplace, they are offering a product that its buyers may not know how to use.
Insurers must provide education and outreach for newer enrollees who may not know
how to utilize their plans properly. For example, new enrollees may go to the ER instead
of going to a lower cost general practitioner for a routine issue because they do not have a
family doctor. Teaching new enrollees how to use their plan correctly keeps costs down
for the entire market and may not be something larger insurers anticipated having to do
when entering the market. Ultimately, success for insurers translates to success for the
marketplace.
Affordability and Competition Analysis: This section focuses on my findings on
determinants of affordability in the marketplace. This analysis will be based on data from
the healthcare.gov platform, so only states using the federal marketplace will be included.
I will only consider data from 2015, 2016, and 2017. I am excluding 2014 because it was
the first year of the marketplace, so insurers lacked reliable data to formulate premiums.
The data set from HHS contains premiums from all plans on the marketplace in the given
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year. I only considered the second lowest cost silver plan (also called the benchmark
plan) for a single 40 year-old. The marketplace subsidies are based on the second lowest
cost plan in the rating area (usually county). Health insurers generally consider a single
40 year old when creating a baseline. I condensed the final data set to only contain
counties in the market since 2015, the premiums from 2015-2017, the number of insurers
in the market from 2015-2017, a dummy variable for if Aetna or UnitedHealthcare
offered a plan in that region in 2016, a dummy variable if the second lowest cost plan
switched from a PPO to HMO (should lower price), a dummy variable if the second
lowest cost plan switched from an HMO to a PPO (should increase price), and a
population factor. The population data comes from linking the HHS data set to census
data. The population for each county was assigned a factor (a dummy variable) based on
the following table:

Range
0- 1,000
1,001- 5,000
5,001- 10,000
10,001- 25,000
25,001- 50,000
50,001- 100,000
100,001-500,000
500,001 -1,000,000
>1,000,000

Population Factor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Using this data, I created a linear model to predict 2017 premiums based on the 2016
premium. I decided to use a logarithmic regression model in order to understand the
percent effect of each variable. The original model, using all the variables I created, is as
followed:
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Figure 6
The variable PPO_HMO_Change1, which measures if the second lowest cost plan
switched from a PPO to an HMO only had an effect at the 5% level. Although this effect
is significant at conventional levels, only 151 of the 2512 plans in the data set switched
from a PPO to an HMO. Also, this estimate was positive despite the fact premiums are
expected to fall when a plan switches from a PPO to a more restrictive HMO. Also, only
421 of the 2512 plans switched from an HMO to a PPO. Since these variables contain a
relatively small percentage of the total plans in the data set and were not very meaningful,
I felt that these variables were fairly noisy and decided to eliminate them from the final
model.
The new model is as followed.
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Figure 7
The adjusted R-squared (which penalizes the model for having more variables and being
more complicated) is 0.63. These variables are somewhat correlated to premium. All of
the variables in the model are statistically significant at the 0.001 level. The significance
of the variables ‘Aetna_UHC’, ‘Pop_Factor’, and ‘Insurers17’ all support the theory that
increased competition leads to lower premiums.
The ‘Aetna_UHC’ variable measures if Aetna or UnitedHealthcare was present in the
market in the year prior. This only takes into account their presence, not if they had the
lowest or second lowest premium. Markets that Aetna or UnitedHealthcare pulled out of
were expected to have a benchmark premium 8.43% higher. The exit of Aetna or
UnitedHealthcare from a market causes a more oligopolistic or monopolistic market
structure, which would logically lead to higher premiums.
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The variable, ‘Pop_Factor’, is based on the population factor table from above and is
statistically significant at the 0.001 level. For each movement into a higher population
bucket, the benchmark premium is expected to decrease by 1.39%. Once again, this
supports the theory that greater competition leads to lower premiums theory. Not only do
larger markets offer more potential enrollees to better spread risk, but also there is more
competition among providers in a more densely populated region. A large city like New
York City or Boston has many different doctors, hospitals, and other medical services
that are competing to be part of an insurance network. If a single provider charges
extremely high prices, there is enough competition where the insurer can reject that
provider and find a less expensive close substitute for their network. As a result, the
competition among providers forces rates down which is reflected in cheaper premiums.
Over time, the difference in population leads to a significant difference in premiums, as
illustrated below in figure 8.
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The spike in premiums in 2017 can be seen very clearly across all populations. Although
higher population does lead to lower premiums, it does not insulate enrollees from
increases in premiums.
Additionally, there are many other factors beyond population that affect premiums. In
2015 and 2016, the difference in premiums due to population had a downward but very
flat trend. The variation in premium among populations was fairly small. However, in
2017, the difference in premiums due to population had a much steeper downward trend.
Likely reasons for the steep trend are the end of the reinsurance program and/or that the
general spike in premiums caused more variation. The first year without a federal
reinsurance program is 2017, so insurers had to increase premiums to cover their greater
responsibility for high cost claims. Areas with higher populations have a larger risk pool,
so insurers are able to better spread the risk of high cost claimants throughout the plan’s
enrollees without the help of a federal reinsurance program. However, smaller
populations cannot spread high claims as effectively. One large claim among a small
population can skew the average amount of a claim upwards significantly. Premiums
would have to increase significantly to cover a few high cost enrollees.
Furthermore, a more populated area would likely have more insurers. To increase market
share and remain competitive, insurers must find ways to lower premiums. In more
monopolistic markets, insurers have less of an incentive to lower premiums because most
enrollees are subsidized and will continue to purchase coverage from that one plan
instead of exiting the market. This is supported by the fact that the variable, ‘Insurers17’,
which counts the number of insurers in the market, is significant at the 0.001 level. For
each additional insurer in the market, premiums are expected to decrease by 8.13%. The
combination of the number of insurers in a market and the population is especially
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powerful. Of the 2512 counties on the federal exchange since 2015, only 780 of them
have three or more insurers in the market. Counties that have three or more insurers have
an average monthly premium of $342.02 while counties with just one or two insurers
have an average monthly premium of $455.14, over $100 more. This effect is illustrated
below in figure 9.

Average 2017 Premium By Population Factor and Number of
Insurers
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Figure 9

Regardless of the population of an area, competition among insurers leads to lower
premiums. Unfortunately, over half of the counties in the federal marketplaces have only
1 or 2 insurers, which leads to significantly higher premiums. The spike in premiums in
2017 along with the stifling of competition due to the high profile pullouts calls for
changes to the law in order to create a more stable marketplace.
Future of Health Care Reform: In March 2017, the Republican majority in Congress
and President Trump announced a replacement plan of the ACA. Throughout the past
seven years, Republicans have fought the ACA tooth and nail and campaigned on
‘repealing and replacing’ the ACA. Now that the Republicans control both the legislative
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and executive branch, they have drafted their own legislation that they hope will fulfill
their campaign promises.
In early March, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan released the American Health Care Act
(AHCA) as a replacement to the ACA. Surprisingly, this bill is not the antithesis to the
ACA and is far from the full repeal many Republicans desired. The main features of the
bill involve a replacement of the income-based tax credits with age-based tax credits, the
repeal of the individual mandate, the repeal of some ACA era taxes on health insurers and
high income earners, and finally the reduction of Medicaid expansion and Medicaid
funds.48 The change of the tax credit from income-based to age-based will significantly
alter the risk pool in the individual market. However, the CBO predicts the individual
market will remain stable in most areas.48
Currently, the ACA subsidies are designed to cap the amount lower income people pay
for insurance each year, regardless of the premium. Therefore, this population will buy
insurance at the same cost year after year. The subsidies are cut off at 400% of the FPL.
The AHCA plans replace this with an age-based flat tax credit, starting at $2,000 for
those younger than 30 and up to $4,000 for those 60 and older.48 Although AHCA offers
tax credits to those with incomes above 400% of the FPL, the flat tax credit will grow at
the rate of the CPI index for all urban consumers plus 1% and will not take into account
geographic variations in premium.48 Premiums and medical trend tend to grow much
faster than general inflation, so the relative value of the tax credit will decrease each year
Furthermore, the AHCA plans to change the age rating rules from the ACA. Previously,
insurers could charge older citizens only three times the amount of a young person; the
AHCA increases this rate to 5:1.48 Also, the AHCA calls for a phase out of the
requirements on actuarial value. Insurers will be able to offer less expensive, less
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generous, catastrophic plans that only appeal to low-utilizers like young people.48 The
cumulative effect of these changes will likely lock out sicker people, older people, and
poorer people from the market.
The lobbying group for health insurers, AHIP, has had a mixed reaction to the bill. In a
letter to Congress, AHIP President Marilyn Tavenner implied the proposed tax credit
might be too skimpy. AHIP prefers a tax credit formula that takes into account age and
income to “help ensure that more people stay covered.”49 Insurers’ goals should include
enrolling as many people as possible, so they can spread risk and maximize premium
revenues. This is why insurers cooperated with the Obama administration in drafting the
ACA: they knew the ACA would add many more people into the individual market. Part
of the lukewarm reaction to AHCA derives from the reduction of coverage. AHCA is
expected to increase the number of uninsured citizens by 24 million compared to the
current law.48 This number is significant for many reasons, but from the business
perspective of insurers, this means 24 million fewer participants.
AHCA was supposed to be the first of the GOP’s three-pronged solution to America’s
health care woes.51 The first prong consists of passing AHCA. The second prong involves
loosening Obama-era regulations on insurers to stabilize the exchange. The third involves
passing other health care related reforms outside budget reconciliation.
Experts have questioned the effectiveness of some of the third prong ideas, specifically
high-risk pools and selling across state lines. Several states had established high-risk
pools in the later half of the 20th century.8 Many of the states that offered high-risk pools
had a waiting list or an enrollment freeze, and enrollees still had to pay higher than
standard rates for insurance.8 In this model, states would depend on government money to
subsidize the high-risk pool. An estimate by the Commonwealth Fund predicts a national
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high-risk pool would need to cover 15.4 million people at net federal cost of $178.1
billion per year.52 AHCA allocates a maximum of $10 billion per year to high-risk pools.
High-risk pools would be unlikely to work because they would certainly never achieve
the necessary level of funding. Insurers would either have to take a loss or charge higher
premiums to the unhealthiest individuals. The Republicans proposing this plan are the
same people who advocate reduced federal spending.
Furthermore, the requirement of community rated premiums is an extremely popular
provision of the ACA. High-risk pools would remove higher claimants from the general
risk pool and force them to pay higher rates, which would be politically unpopular.
However, other types of insurance currently utilize high-risk pools, particularly auto
insurance. Pat Teufel, a past president of the Casualty Actuarial Society, thinks a highrisk pool would be unlikely to work in health insurance. She believes that medical trend
is too high and the focus should be on lowering prices for all, rather than targeting highrisk individuals. Premiums in the car insurance reflect behavior and are actuarially fair,
which is why a high-risk pool is necessary. A good driver does not pay a higher premium
to subsidize a worse driver. Drivers can change their behavior by, for example, driving
slower or without distractions to exit a high-risk pool and receive lower premiums.
However, one cannot exit the high-risk pool in health insurance by changing one’s
behavior. One cannot simply change a serious health diagnosis. In addition, health
insurance is community rated. As a society, we feel it is unfair to charge people based on
health conditions that cannot be changed, such as asthma, genetic disorders, or simply
being a woman. By spreading the cost throughout society, insurers can still make a profit
while not penalizing enrollees for having an uncontrollable health condition. Regardless
of the existence of a high-risk pool or not, the government will still be subsidizing the
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higher costs for sicker individuals. It would be more politically feasible to combine
healthy and sick people into a single pool and subsidize that pool.
Selling insurance across state lines is a personal favorite of President Trump, who
mentioned it during his first joint address to Congress. However, insurance experts do not
feel the same way. Some states have actually already tried to allow insurers to sell across
state lines, but out-of-state insurers have not chosen to enter another state’s market.20
Creating provider networks is largely a local task, so it is difficult for an out-of-state
insurer to establish a network, promise high enrollment, and negotiate competitive rates.53
In addition, enrollees in high cost areas would still have to pay higher premiums because
premiums are a function of local health costs, regardless of what state the coverage is
purchased in.53
Because of the McCarran-Ferguson act, insurance is regulated at the state level. Selling
insurance across state lines would lead to a so-called race to the bottom. States with more
regulation would have higher premiums whereas states with less regulation would have
lower premiums. The regulations and consumer protections would be favorable for highrisk enrollees, but lower premiums in the less regulated states would attract a healthy
population. Therefore, there would be adverse selection in states with more regulation,
and possibly threaten the viability of the insurance market in these states.20 If insurance
was regulated at the federal level, selling across state lines may work because insurers
would be unable to game the system. Once again, the people proposing this idea, the
Republicans, are fundamentally against more federal regulation. Selling insurance across
state lines would fail as a result of Republican aversion to centralized regulations and the
difficulty in establishing competitive networks.

Carnale 40
AHCA has received criticism from the left for not being generous enough and for
removing Obama-era protections and from the right for not going far enough in removing
federal regulations. Various trade and consumer groups, like the American Medical
Association, the American Hospital Association and the AARP, have voiced their
opposition along with think tanks from all ideologies.54 The proposal was widely disliked
by voters, who overwhelmed their representatives with calls, town hall meetings, and
protests. Ultimately, Speaker Ryan pulled the bill from the floor because he could not
garner enough supporting votes. The future of health care in America is extremely
uncertain at this point because, as President Trump recently learned, health care is
complicated.55
Possible Reforms to the ACA: President Obama is the first to acknowledge that the
ACA has much room for improvement. He understands that “the nation typically reaches
its greatest heights when we find common ground between the public and private good
and adjust along the way.”56
President Obama has advocated adding a public option to the ACA, especially in areas of
the country where competition is limited.56 A public option would likely be able to use
the federal government’s influence to negotiate rates at or near Medicare rates.20 The
American Academy of Actuaries recommends that the federal government still sell plans
with a self-supporting premium to avoid disrupting the private market too much.20
Providers fear the establishment of a public option would lead to lower reimbursement
rates.11 Despite these worries, the public option could be extremely beneficial to the
individual market. As the analysis of premiums from earlier shows, markets with more
insurer competition have much lower premiums. Even if the public option could not
negotiate rates as low as Medicare rates, the federal government still maintains an
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advantage over private insurers in terms of administrative costs. Slightly over 20% of
each premium dollar from private insurance goes to either profit or administrative costs.57
On the other hand, a total of 6.4% of Medicare’s budget goes towards administrative
costs.57 Unlike private insurers, a public option plan would not be bound to stockholders.
The principal-agent problem would be alleviated because the users of the public option
are also voters.11 If they did not like how the public option is currently being run, they
could vote in other officials to make the desired changes. 11 The federal government has
experience in creating a well-received health plan and can leverage this experience to
force competition in struggling markets to bring down health care prices.
Also, the government could theoretically force individuals that do not have a private
individual plan and fall outside the employer or government system to enroll in the public
option. Although the individual mandate already requires that all Americans to have
health insurance, its weak enforcement has factored into many Americans’ decision to
stay uninsured. Since the federal government would control a public option, it could
potentially auto-enroll participants who do not have other health coverage. If individuals
are auto-enrolled, the uninsured rate in the United States becomes effectively 0 and
charity care would be virtually eliminated. When an uninsured person receives care, they
are forced to pay much higher rates because they do not have the negotiating power of an
insurance company behind them. As a result, many uninsured people cannot afford their
hospital bills and go into medical debt or the bills remain unpaid. The cost of
uncompensated, ‘charity care’ is implicit in the providers’ negotiated rates with insurers.
Insurers then pass on these higher rates to the enrollees through higher premiums who
effectively subsidize the higher costs of the uninsured.
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Another, although not as commonly discussed, idea for health care reform is the
introduction of all-payer rate setting. This method, coupled with a public option, could
potentially be very effective in lowering health care costs. Normally, reimbursement rates
are determined through a negotiation between a single insurer and provider. If an insurer
lacks negotiating power, the provider can charge much higher rates. All-payer rate setting
gives insurers more negotiating power at the expense of each insurer’s competitive
advantage to receive relatively lower rates. In this system, all the insurers in a region
negotiate together or pay the same price set by an independent regulatory agency.58
Insurers compete on the quality of their services, not their ability to negotiate rates.
Maryland is currently the only state that has all-payer rate setting, and a state regulatory
agency sets the reimbursement rates for inpatient, hospital-based outpatient, and
emergency services that all insurers must pay.58 Maryland has found success with this
system. The state’s cost per case is 2% lower than the national average, resulting in $43
billion in savings since the program was implemented in the 1970s.58 Insurers have been
satisfied with the program, especially because they benefit from the greater negotiating
power of the federal government. The federal government programs cannot opt out of
negotiations unless the regulatory agency recommends increasing Medicare costs above
the national average.58
In Maryland, rates must be approved by HSCRC (Health Services Cost Review
Commission), an independent governmental agency.58 The goal of the HSCRC is not to
cap profits; rather it is to cap costs.59 In Maryland, all-payer rate setting essentially limits
the budget of hospitals by eliminating hospitals’ power to demand rates multiple times
above cost.59 However, there are no regulations on how hospitals spend this budget, so if
hospitals are efficient in allocating their resources and provide the necessary care to
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prevent over-utilization, the hospitals can still profit. The all-payer rating setting system
aligns the incentives of the hospital with the insurer, as they both want to control
‘utilization per case.’58 Because the HSCRC sets a global budget for the hospital rather
than the hospital setting its own budget through negotiations with different insurers, the
amount of mark-up in Maryland hospital prices is much less than the national average.58
Because all payers (and in the Maryland system, the uninsured) pay the same rate,
hospitals cannot shift costs.58 Smaller insurers with low negotiating power pay the same
rate as the largest insurer in the state. The staggering difference in the average hospital
markup in Maryland against the rest of the country is shown below. 58

Figure 10
An all-payer rate setting system prevents hospitals from grossly overcharging insurers
and patients. Yet, in Maryland, hospitals are not going out of business and patients are
still finding access to care. If all-payer rate setting were applied on a national level, a
significant drop in premiums would be likely because hospitals would no longer be able
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to charge multiple times their costs in the opaque negotiations process. The MLR
regulations in the ACA force insurers to pass on these cost savings to enrollees instead of
keeping level premiums and profiting.
Furthermore, all-payer rate setting controls costs without directly rationing services.
Currently, in the United States, services are not directly rationed by the central
government like in single payer systems in other industrialized countries. Some
Americans’ opposition to health care reform is partially derived from a fear of rationing
leading to a loss of access. However, there is evidence that all-payer rate setting can
‘temper excessive use of cost-increasing technologies’ but does not reduce their
availability.”60 All-payer rate setting is more politically viable than converting a singlepayer system because it controls costs while keeping a free market structure without
limiting access. Currently, at least five other countries use all-payer rate setting systems
including Germany and Japan. 61 Over the period from 2000 to 2008, the United States’
health spending as a percent of GDP grew 2.7 percentage points, whereas Japan’s and
Germany’s grew .8 and .3 percentage points respectively over the same period.61 As other
countries have demonstrated, a nationally implemented all-payer rate setting system
could be extremely effective in tempering health care costs.
Unlike many of the reforms proposed, all-payer rate setting has a direct effect on
lowering costs. Premiums will continue to rise and damage the stability of the individual
market until the United States controls its cost problem. All-payer rate setting forces
providers to accept a lower rate in exchange for business with all insurers. Furthermore,
all-payer rate setting allows for quality adjusted payment initiatives to be easily
established system-wide. Currently, the health system in the United States operates
largely on a fee-for-service basis where providers are reimbursed for each service they
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perform, regardless of its need. A quality based system rewards providers that better
manage cases. This leads to better outcomes for patients, which translates to lower
claims.
Furthermore, the ACA has been less effective in rural areas, which tend to have fewer
insurers and a monopolistic provider environment. In the current structure, doctors’
increased negotiating power allows them to demand higher reimbursement rates, leading
to increased premiums for consumers. All-payer rate setting would allow insurers to
negotiate a lower rate and return the savings to consumers. An all-payer rate setting
combined with a public option could potentially be very effective because all-payer rate
setting prevents the public option from undercutting the reimbursement rates of private
insurers while adding more competition to the market. In this model, the role of the
insurer would need to change dramatically. Currently, the most successful insurers
typically have the most negotiating power. If these changes were implemented, insurers
would have to compete on the quality of their administrative services, ability to manage
conditions, and other, less tangible qualities. The insurance industry would have to
change to a more patient-centered industry to survive, which would benefit all
Americans.
Although these combined changes would be very effective in redefining and improving
the American health care industry, they necessitate tremendous amounts political capital
and will not come quickly. These changes should not be a replacement for the ACA.
Rather they should complement the current law. In the short term, the ACA can be
improved by increasing the strength of its regulations.
First, lawmakers should try to alter some regulations to increase the size of the risk pool.
The original enrollment numbers projected by the CBO in 2010 are much less than the
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actual numbers.23 For political reasons, the individual mandate is extremely weak. As
result, healthy people who do not receive subsidized coverage in the individual market
tend to forgo coverage. For an example, according to the data analysis done earlier, the
average premium for the second lowest cost silver plan for a single 40 year old man is
about $5,040 annually. If this individual makes $50,000, which is just above 400% of the
FPL, then paying the $1,250 mandate seems much more appealing than paying $5,040 in
solely premiums for insurance. Insurers are frustrated with the individual mandate’s lack
of teeth, which has led to 10% less young adults in the marketplace than projected.35
Other countries that have a private insurance-based universal coverage system have much
harsher penalties. For example, in Switzerland, individuals that do not have coverage
within three months are penalized with garnished wages and possible jail time.35 A
harsher individual mandate penalty will bring more, especially healthy, people into the
market to create a better risk pool.
Increasing the generosity of the subsidies by increasing their amount and expanding
eligibility would also improve the risk pool. Despite the subsidies, affordability is still a
major issue for a lot of people, especially those right above 400% of the FPL.20 The ACA
subsidies are less generous than originally proposed because President Obama did not
want the bill to add to the deficit.2 The ACA has been successful in lowering the deficit
and in fact, has cost 28% less than the CBO projections.56 The federal government could
easily use some of these savings to expand the subsidies and provide affordable coverage
to more people.
The federal government could also improve its outreach initiatives. A study done in
Texas, Arkansas, and Kentucky found that awareness of the ACA was the strongest
predictor in applying for coverage while application assistance was the strongest
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predictor of successful enrollment.62 Kentucky had the greatest success out of the three
states partially because it made specific effort to provide general outreach and awareness
efforts and branded itself distinct from the less popular national law.62 The state of Texas
had the worst enrollment outcome because it effectively tried to oppose the law at every
possible decision. The study concluded that “state policy decisions are likely having a
critical impact…on who chooses to apply for coverage and whether they successfully
enroll.” 62
In 2017, the effect of outreach on enrollment became fairly obvious. Marketplace signups were in line with 2016, until the Trump administration stopped outreach efforts and
caused a decline in enrollment. 63 (These states control their own advertising.) The final
enrollment data has indicated that states that run their own exchanges have had a stronger
performance than the federal marketplace.63 The decline in enrollment will have a
negative effect on consumers. The nonpartisan Brookings Institute estimates that a 5%
decline in federal marketplace sign ups translates to roughly 1% higher individual market
claims.63 To mitigate this problem, the federal government could create a minimum
standard for outreach and provide support to states that are more averse to running
outreach efforts. Most importantly, the government should offer easy to understand,
accessible, and heavily advertised enrollment assistance to its citizens. The government
must stress how the subsidies work in order to make insurance affordable and explain to
its citizens why it is important to purchase coverage, no matter if you are young, old,
sick, or healthy.
On the insurer side, the federal government needs to provide more premium support.
Insurers were extremely angry over the missing risk corridor payments. Even former
CMS head under President Obama, Andy Slavitt, admits it would be better if risk corridor
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payments were made. 64 Honoring the payments may not bring insurers back into the
individual market, but it would help insurers that are currently in the market become
more profitable and encourage them to stay. However, risk corridor makes better sense as
a temporary program because as insurers gain more data about ACA enrollees, they
should be able to price their premiums properly. Reinsurance, on the other hand, should
become a permanent program. A federal reinsurance pool offsets some risk for insurers,
leading to lower premiums. The ending of reinsurance contributed to the spike in
premiums in 2017. Continuing this program would lead to a better management of risk
for insurers and eliminate some of the fear in entering the individual market. Slavitt,
along with the American Academy of Actuaries, supports the establishment of a
permanent reinsurance program and believes it would help stabilize the market.20,64 The
risk adjustment program should be periodically updated to better serve the needs of
insurers. Currently, risk adjustment is determined based on the market average premium,
which inherently benefits larger insurers.65 The formula should be adjusted to take into
account the size of an insurer to avoid giving one insurer too much clout. Also, risk
adjustment is dependent on doctors identifying conditions and coding them correctly.65
Taking pharmacy data into account may help insurers catch conditions more quickly and
easily, without spending as much time and energy to educate providers.65 The risk
adjustment model must be recalibrated every few years to make sure it is properly
compensating insurers.65 Changing these regulations on the consumer and insurer side is
definitely feasible and will stabilize the exchanges in the short term. In the long term, the
United States should explore adding more competition and capping costs by utilizing
both a public option plan and an all-payer rate setting system. The competition will force
insurers to offer a high-quality, low cost product, while capping costs will lead to overall
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lower premiums in the market. Although health insurer profits will not reach the high
levels of years past, the United States can create a system where everyone will be
guaranteed coverage at an affordable rate and where health insurers can be guaranteed a
large customer base and stability.
Conclusion: Essentially, health care reform in America boils down to two different
questions: 1) What is the federal government’s role in ensuring health insurance coverage
for every American? and 2) How can the United States control health care prices?
Republicans and Democrats have contrasting views on the first question. Democrats tout
the reductions in the uninsured rate due to provisions in the ACA. On the other hand, the
Republican proposal for health care increases the number of uninsured by 24 million, tilts
the market towards the younger and richer people, and contains a large tax cut for the
wealthy. The Republicans’ vitriol for the ACA and their replacement bill make it clear
that they do not feel it is the federal government’s role to ensure that every citizen is
insured. Until we, as a country, decide whether it is a right of all citizens to have health
insurance, sustainable health care reform will be impossible. Every time the party in
power changes, so will the regulations and laws surrounding health care. The individual
market and government regulation have now become very intertwined, so the political
uncertainty around reform will undoubtedly create an unstable market.
To answer the second question, prices in the health care sector rise much faster than
inflation each year. However, no prominent health care reform plan has tried to attack
health care costs. Health care premiums are a function of health care costs, so until the
United States controls its cost problem, premiums will continue to rise. Drastic policy
measures, such as adding a public option and pursuing an all-payer rate setting system,
must be pursued to lower costs. A public option would place downward pressure on
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premiums by adding more competition to the market, while all-payer rate setting ensures
all insurers pay the same reimbursement rates to providers. All-payer rate setting forces
all insurers to negotiate together, which prevents providers from gouging insurers in
individual negotiations. Furthermore, sharpening the teeth of ACA regulations, such as
better enforcement of the individual mandate and premium stabilization programs, work
to lower premiums by mitigating adverse selection issues.
The ACA should not be an end all, be all. Rather, it should be the first step in a process to
reform health care in America. The ACA seems like it is here to stay. When the ACA
was in danger of being repealed, public opinion quickly turned against AHCA. Once
people realized how the ACA changed their quality of life, they were determined to keep
the law on the books. Politicians should build on the success of the ACA in order to pass
regulations that control prices in the health care market. Ultimately, the United States will
keep the Affordable Care Act as the law of the land, but it can and should be evolved to
continually respond to America’s complex and challenging health care needs.
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